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Abstract	1	
Searching	for	mates	is	a	critical	stage	in	the	life-cycle	of	most	internally,	and	many	externally,	2	
fertilising	species.	Males	usually	invest	more	in	this	costly	activity	than	females,	but	the	reasons	3	
for	this	are	poorly	understood.	Previous	models	have	shown	that	female-biased	parental	4	
investment,	including	anisogamy,	does	not	by	itself	select	for	male-biased	mate	searching,	so	it	5	
requires	additional	explanations.	Here	we	correct	and	expand	upon	earlier	models,	and	present	6	
two	novel	hypotheses	that	might	explain	the	evolution	of	male-biased	mate	searching.	The	‘carry-7	
over	hypothesis’	states	that	females	benefit	less	from	searching	if	the	associated	costs	affect	other	8	
stages	of	the	life-cycle,	rather	than	arising	only	while	searching.	It	is	relevant	to	the	evolution	of	9	
morphological	traits	that	improve	searching	efficiency	but	are	also	expressed	in	other	contexts.	10	
The	‘mating	window	hypothesis’	states	that	females	benefit	less	from	searching	if	their	life-cycle	11	
includes	intervals	during	which	the	exact	timing	of	mating	does	not	matter	for	the	appropriate	12	
timing	of	reproduction	(e.g.	due	to	sperm	storage	or	delayed	embryo	implantation).	Such	intervals	13	
are	more	likely	to	exist	for	females	given	the	general	pattern	of	greater	female	parental	14	
investment.	Our	models	shed	new	light	on	classic	arguments	about	sex	role	evolution.	15	
	16	
Introduction	17	
Searching	for	mates	is	a	critical	stage	in	the	life-cycle	of	most	internally,	and	many	externally,	18	
fertilising	species.	In	a	broad	sense,	search	effort	can	be	defined	as	a	costly	investment	in	traits	19	
that	facilitate	encounters	with	potential	mates;	including	mobility,	advertisement	calls	or	displays,	20	
and	pheromone	production	(Kokko	and	Wong	2007).	Often	such	traits	are	sexually	dimorphic,	with	21	
males	typically	exhibiting	higher	levels	of	effort	(Andersson	1994;	Birkhead	and	Moller	1998;	22	
Simmons	2001).	A	classic	explanation	for	this	asymmetry	is	that,	in	species	where	females	have	23	
lower	potential	reproductive	rates	than	males	driven	by	their	greater	parental	investment,	males	24	
	 3	
benefit	more	than	females	from	elevating	their	mating	rate	(Bateman	1948;	Trivers	1972;	Clutton-25	
Brock	and	Vincent	1991).	On	closer	inspection,	however,	the	simplicity	of	this	argument	is	26	
deceptive:	in	a	formal	model	of	the	evolution	of	mate-searching,	Hammerstein	and	Parker	(1987)	27	
found	that,	regardless	of	asymmetry	in	parental	investment,	there	exist	alternative	evolutionarily	28	
stable	strategies	(ESSs)	of	male-only	or	female-only	searching.	On	the	other	hand,	they	noted	that	29	
“the	selective	forces	which	stabilise	a	high	level	of	male	mobility	are	stronger	than	those	which	30	
stabilise	a	high	level	of	female	mobility”,	concluding	that	it	would	be	desirable	to	determine	the	31	
‘range	of	attraction’	of	each	ESS	in	an	explicitly	dynamic	model	of	the	selection	process.	Taking	up	32	
this	challenge,	Kokko	and	Wong	(2007)	presented	a	model	which	described	such	ranges	of	33	
attraction,	reporting	that	these	are	symmetrical	when	the	sexes	differ	only	in	their	extent	of	34	
parental	investment.	As	we	will	show,	however,	this	conclusion	was	incorrect.	Our	present	paper	35	
therefore	supersedes	Kokko	and	Wong	(2007),	which	contained	technical	errors	that	have	led	to	36	
its	retraction	(see	Appendix).	37	
	38	
Here	we	derive	a	new	baseline	model	for	the	evolution	of	mate	searching	where	the	sexes	only	39	
differ	in	their	level	of	parental	investment.	We	then	explore	two	extensions	of	the	model	based	on	40	
consequences	of	anisogamy	that	have	largely	been	overlooked,	but	are	likely	to	be	of	general	41	
importance.	These	are	respectively	related	to	the	existence	of	‘mating	windows’	and	of	‘carry	42	
over’	effects	(both	defined	below).		43	
	44	
In	species	with	internal	fertilisation,	females’	life	cycle	typically	includes	intervals	we	will	call	45	
‘mating	windows’,	during	which	the	exact	timing	of	mating	does	not	affect	the	timing	of	offspring	46	
production,	so	long	as	sperm	is	acquired	before	zygotes	need	to	develop.	Depending	on	the	47	
species,	mating	windows	can	be	short	(e.g.,	a	few	hours	around	ovulation)	or	long	(e.g.	weeks	or	48	
	4	
months	in	organisms	with	specialized	sperm	storage	organs;	Orr	and	Brennan	2015).	According	to	49	
our	definition,	a	mating	window	begins	when	a	female	is	ready	to	receive	sperm	for	the	50	
fertilisation	of	her	next	(batch	of)	offspring,	and	it	ends	at	the	latest	insemination	point	that	would	51	
ensure	reproduction	at	the	earliest	(optimal)	time	permitted	by	other	intrinsic	and	extrinsic	52	
factors,	without	unnecessary	delay	due	to	lack	of	sperm.	For	example,	certain	forms	of	parental	53	
investment	(e.g.,	formation	of	nutrient-rich	eggs,	or	building	up	reserves	for	pregnancy)	take	time	54	
before	reproduction.	Similarly,	females	must	sometimes	wait	for	suitable	external	conditions	to	55	
breed.	If	females	schedule	their	mating	activity	to	overlap	with	such	delays,	a	mating	window	56	
arises	that	allows	them	to	acquire	sperm	before	it	is	needed.	The	intervening	time	can	be	bridged	57	
by	mechanisms	such	as	sperm	storage	or	embryonic	diapause.	An	important	consequence	of	this	58	
is	that,	if	females	can	expect	to	mate	at	least	once	per	mating	window,	they	should	be	in	no	hurry	59	
to	acquire	a	mate.	If	they	mate	earlier	they	will	just	have	to	wait	longer	afterwards,	until	the	60	
mating	window	ends,	which	confers	no	benefit.	By	contrast,	a	male	only	has	to	wait	until	he	has	61	
replenished	his	sperm	supply	before	being	ready	to	reproduce	again	(with	a	different	female).	A	62	
male	that	mates	sooner	will	therefore	return	to	the	mating	pool	sooner	and	this,	all	else	being	63	
equal,	should	elevate	his	lifetime	mating	success.	A	mating	window	presumably	weakens	any	64	
female	incentive	to	invest	in	mate	searching,	for	a	reason	that	is	logically	distinct	from	the	extent	65	
of	parental	investment	per	se.	Mating	windows	do	not	require	that	females	mate	multiply,	so	their	66	
occurrence	is	conceptually	distinct	from	that	of	polyandry	and	sperm	competition.	We	make	this	67	
point	because	previous	models	have	explicitly	included	mating	windows	to	generate	polyandry	68	
(e.g.	Kokko	&	Wong	2007).	Here	we	show	how	the	existence	of	mating	windows	for	females,	69	
independent	of	any	role	for	polyandry,	affects	the	evolution	of	sex	roles	for	mate	searching.		70	
	71	
	 5	
Previous	models	of	mate	searching	have	constrained	the	mortality	costs	of	mate	searching	to	72	
those	that	arise	while	searching.	It	is,	however,	plausible	that	investment	into	searching	more	73	
efficiently,	or	more	intensely,	will	have	‘carry	over’	mortality	costs	that	affect	other	stages	of	the	74	
life-cycle.	This	is	obviously	relevant	to	the	evolution	of	morphological	traits	that	are	not	at	their	75	
naturally	selected	optimum	because	this	improves	searching	efficiency,	but	are	then	expressed	in	76	
non-searching	contexts	where	they	might	be	disfavoured	(e.g.	body	size,	energetically	costly	77	
musculature).	More	generally,	it	is	possible	that	investment	into	mate	searching	reduces	other	78	
fitness	components	(e.g.	lowers	fecundity).	‘Carry-over’	effects	are	likely	to	be	important	because	79	
previous	models	indicate	that	general	mortality	costs	of	sexually	selected	traits	can	create	a	sexual	80	
asymmetry	in	the	scope	of	investment	into	traits	that	elevate	mating	rates	(Kokko	et	al.	2012).	81	
	82	
Model	framework	83	
Following	a	tradition	in	the	literature	of	sex	role	evolution	(e.g.	Clutton-Brock	and	Parker	1992;	84	
Kokko	and	Monaghan	2001),	we	distinguish	two	life	phases	during	which	individuals	are	either	85	
available	for	mating	and	‘in	the	mating	pool’	(‘time-in’)	or	unavailable	(‘time-out’).	Time-out	arises	86	
while	processing	the	consequences	of	mating	(fig	1a-c)	or,	in	one	model	variant	(fig.	1b),	while	87	
waiting	for	the	end	of	a	mating	window.	If	time-out	is	used	to	accumulate	resources	to	be	invested	88	
in	offspring,	its	duration	can	be	interpreted	as	a	measure	of	parental	investment	(Trivers	1972).	89	
Adult	life	begins	in	the	‘time-in’	state,	and	individuals	alternate	between	states	according	to	90	
constant	transition	rates.	We	used	a	continuous	time	model	where	events	are	asynchronous	91	
among	individuals,	leading	to	stable	state	frequencies.	For	simplicity,	we	assume	that	every	92	
encounter	between	individuals	in	the	‘time-in’	state	results	in	mating.		93	
	94	
Basic	model	95	
	6	
Following	Kokko	and	Wong	(2007),	we	consider	a	population	whose	life-cycle	is	described	by	the	96	
continuous-time	transition	matrix:	97	
	98	
𝑄 =
−𝜇! − !! 𝑚 0 0!! 𝑔 − 1 𝑚 − 𝜇! 0 𝑔𝑚0 0 −𝜇! − !! 𝑚0 𝑔𝑚 !! 𝑔 − 1 𝑚 − 𝜇!
	 	 	 (1)	99	
	100	
Here,	element	qi,j	(in	row	i,	column	j)	specifies	the	per-capita	rate	at	which	individuals	of	state	j	101	
contribute	to	entering	and	leaving	of	state	i	(see	Hardling	et	al.	2003).	The	relevant	states	are	102	
(from	left	to	right,	and	top	to	bottom):	females	in	time-out,	females	in	time-in,	males	in	time-out,	103	
males	in	time-in.	For	example,	the	first	entry	q1,1	states	that	females	in	time-out	disappear	at	rate	104	 −𝜇!	owing	to	mortality,	and	at	rate	−1/𝑇	owing	to	their	return	to	the	mating	pool,	where	they	105	
re-appear	at	rate	1/𝑇		in	element	q2,1.	So	T	is	the	average	duration	of	female	time-out.	(The	106	
corresponding	male	variables	are	marked	with	a	tilde,	~.)	No	direct	transition	is	possible	from	107	
females	in	time-out	to	males	of	any	kind,	so	the	last	two	entries	in	this	column	are	zeros.	In	the	108	
second	column,	element	q1,2	states	that	females	transition	from	time-in	to	time-out	at	their	109	
mating	rate,	m,	implying	that	females	mate	only	once	per	reproductive	cycle.	Mating	leads	to	the	110	
production	of	2g	adult	offspring	of	each	sex,	which	enter	time-in	in	elements	q2,2,	q2,4,	q4,2,	and	111	
q4,4,	respectively.	This	corresponds	to	a	(genetic)	contribution	of	g	per	parent,	where	g	is	chosen	112	
such	that	population	size	remains	stable.	Offspring	are	produced	immediately	upon	mating	(but	113	
see	mating	window	model	below).	Females	in	time-in	are	subject	to	mortality	𝜇!.	Throughout,	we	114	
assume	an	even	primary	sex	ratio.	Defining	the	operational	sex	ratio	𝛽	as	the	ratio	between	males	115	
and	females	in	time-in	(derived	by	eq.	3.	in	Kokko	and	Monaghan	2001),	we	let	mating	rates	be	116	
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𝑚[𝑥,𝛽] = 𝑀𝑓[𝑥,𝑦] 𝛽		and	𝑚[𝑦,𝛽] = 𝑀𝑓[𝑥,𝑦] !!	,	to	satisfy	the	consistency	requirement	that	117	
they	must	be	linked	as		𝑚/𝑚 = 𝛽.	(Here	and	elsewhere,	we	omit	function	arguments	for	brevity.)	118	
The	‘encounter	coefficient’	M	captures	species-specific	factors	such	as	movement	efficiency	and	119	
population	density,	and	the	‘search	function’	𝑓[𝑥,𝑦]	specifies	how	female	effort	(x)	and	male	120	
effort	(y)	jointly	affect	the	search	outcome.	We	use	two	forms	of	this	function:	the	additive	case	121	 𝑓 𝑥,𝑦 = 𝑥 + 𝑦	describes	situations	where	sufficient	search	effort	in	one	sex	may	remove	the	122	
need	to	search	in	the	other	sex.	The	multiplicative	case	𝑓 𝑥,𝑦 = 𝑥𝑦	describes	situations	where	123	
both	sexes	must	invest	some	effort	in	order	to	meet.	To	control	how	fast	mortality	increases	with	124	
search	effort,	we	define	a	search	cost	coefficient	c	such	that	𝜇! 𝑥 = 0.1(1+ 𝑥!)	and	𝜇! 𝑦 =125	 0.1(1+ 𝑦!).		126	
We	use	two	alternative	methods	to	calculate	selection	gradients	for	this	model,	to	improve	our	127	
confidence	in	the	robustness	of	the	analysis.	First,	we	calculate	the	selection	gradient	of	trait	k	as	128	
the	partial	derivative	of	the	dominant	eigenvalue	λ	of	the	transition	matrix	with	respect	to	a	rare	129	
mutant’s	k,	as	 𝑢!𝑣! !!!,!!"!,! 	(Caswell	1978;	Pen	and	Weissing	2000),	where	u	is	the	dominant	right	130	
eigenvector	containing	stable	state	frequencies,	and	v	is	the	dominant	left	eigenvector	containing	131	
reproductive	values	(normalised	such	that	 𝑢!𝑣! = 1! ).	The	eigenvectors	and	𝑔 = !!!!"!!!!!!!!!!(!!!!!) 	132	
are	obtained	by	solving	the	systems	 	and	 	(Hardling	et	al.	2003).	If	searching	133	
affects	mortality	only	during	time-in,	then	using	the	information	that	𝑢!/𝑢! = 𝛽	(by	our	definition	134	
of	𝛽)	and	𝑣! = 𝑣!	(the	so-called	‘Fisher	condition’,	which	states	that	fitness,	and	hence	135	
reproductive	value	at	birth,	is	equal	between	the	sexes	when	the	primary	sex	ratio	is	equal;	136	
Houston	and	McNamara	2005)	we	obtain	selection	gradients	(up	to	a	constant):	137	
	138	
	!!!! = (2𝑔 − 1+ !!!!!!)𝑚! − 𝜇!!			 	 	 	 	 	 	 (2a)	139	
v ⋅Q = 0 Q ⋅u = 0
	8	
	140	
!!!! = 𝛽 (2𝑔 − 1+ !!!!!!)𝑚! − 𝜇!! 		 	 	 	 	 	 (2b).		141	
	142	
These	are	the	corrected	versions	of	Kokko	and	Wong’s	(2007)	eqns.	5,	which	failed	to	take	into	143	
account	how	the	duration	of	a	trait’s	expression	affects	its	exposure	to	selection	(see	Appendix).		144	
Second,	we	calculate	selection	gradients	as	proportional	derivatives	of	lifetime	reproductive	145	
success	(fitness)	of	a	rare	mutant	of	each	sex,	 !"[!,!]!"#[!,!]	and	,	 !![!,!]!"![!,!]	.	Although	originally	designed	146	
for	discrete-time	models	(McElreath	and	Boyd	2007,	p	299),	this	method	yields	results	for	the	147	
relative	strength	of	selection	that	are	identical	to	the	previous	method	(both	methods	generate	148	
figures	2-4).	Importantly,	however,	the	fitness	function	used	in	this	method	also	allows	us	to	find	149	
ESSs	analytically.	Fitness	(equivalent	to	the	expected	number	of	matings,	hence	breeding	events)	150	
of	a	mutant	female	with	search	effort	x	is	given	by	151	
	152	 𝑊 𝑥,𝛽 = 𝑝 1+ 𝑠𝑝 !(1− 𝑠𝑝)𝑖!!!! = !!!!"			 	 	 	 	 (3)	153	
	154	
where	𝑝 = !!!!!	is	the	probability	that	a	given	search	ends	in	mating	(rather	than	death),	155	 𝑠 = !/!!/!!!!	is	the	probability	that	a	given	time-out	ends	by	returning	to	the	mating	pool	(rather	156	
than	death),	𝑠𝑝	is	the	probability	that	at	least	one	more	mating	will	follow	after	any	given	mating,	157	
and	(sp)i(1-sp)	is	the	probability	of	mating	exactly	i	additional	times.		158	
	159	
Mating	window	model	160	
Here	we	assume	that,	at	the	beginning	of	their	reproductive	life,	and	after	every	time-out,	females	161	
enter	a	mating	window,	defined	as	an	interval	during	which	the	exact	timing	of	mating	does	not	162	
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matter	for	the	timing	(hence	the	fitness	gain)	of	subsequent	reproduction.	If	mating	does	not	163	
happen	during	a	given	mating	window,	the	female	immediately	enters	another	mating	window.	164	
Unmated	females	transition	to	a	‘time-lag’	state	upon	mating	(fig.	1	b-c).	Depending	on	parameter	165	
settings	(see	below),	females	can	or	can	not	re-mate	during	the	time-lag.	To	capture	the	idea	that	166	
females	who	mate	early	during	a	mating	window	of	duration	F	face	a	correspondingly	longer	time-167	
lag,	we	derive	time-lag	duration	as:	168	
𝐿 𝑥,𝛽 = 𝑚 ∙ 𝑒!!(!!!!) ∙ (𝐹 − 𝑡)𝑑𝑡!! 𝑚 ∙ 𝑒!!(!!!!) 𝑑𝑡!! = 𝐹(𝜇! +𝑚)+ 𝑒!!(!!!!) − 1(𝜇! +𝑚)(1− 𝑒!!(!!!!)) 	
	169	
where	𝑚 ∙ 𝑒!!(!!!!)𝑑𝑡	is	the	probability	that	a	female	mates	for	the	first	time	at	t,	in	which	case	170	
she	faces	time-lag	duration	𝐹 − 𝑡;	the	term	𝑒!!(!!!!)	represents	the	probability	that	she	has	171	
neither	mated	nor	died	before	t.	To	keep	track	of	females	during	the	time-lag,	we	introduce	a	fifth	172	
state	in	the	transition	matrix,	in	the	fifth	row	and	column:	173	
	174	
𝑄 =
−𝜇! − !! 0 0 0 !!!! −𝑚 − 𝜇! 0 !"!! !!0 0 −𝜇! − !! 𝑚 00 0 !! !"! − 1 𝑚 − 𝜇! !!0 𝑚 0 0 −𝜇! − !!
	 	 (3)	175	
Here,	1/𝐿	is	the	rate	at	which	females	transition	from	time-lag	to	the	‘processing	state’	(now	in	176	
row	and	column	one;	see	fig.	1).	The	term		𝜌 𝑥,𝛽 = !/!!/!!!!	is	the	probability	of	surviving	a	time-177	
lag,	and	𝑛 𝑥,𝛽 = 1+ 𝑒!! !!!!! 𝑚! 𝑑𝑡!! = 1+ !!!!!!!!	is	the	expected	number	of	matings	per	178	
female	of	those	that	survive	to	breed.	Here,	𝜇!	and	𝑚!	are	mortality	and	mating	rate	during	the	179	
time-lag.	In	the	monandry	case,	we	substitute	𝜇!	with	𝜇!	and	mL	with	0,	implying	that	females	180	
	10	
spend	the	time-lag	in	time-out,	so	that	𝑛 = 1.	In	the	polyandry	case,	for	simplicity,	we	substitute	181	 𝜇!	with	𝜇!	and	mL	with	m,	implying	that	females	spend	the	time-lag	behaving	like	unmated,	time-182	
in	females.	Offspring	are	produced	during	the	transition	from	time-lag	to	processing	state.	In	183	
elements	q2,4	and	q4,4	,	males’	reproductive	success	per	mating	is	discounted	by	the	probability	 	184	
that	their	mate	survives	to	reproduce,	and	by	average	paternity	1/n.	Female	fitness	is	now	185	 𝑊 𝑥,𝛽 = !"!!!"#		,	and	male	fitness	is	𝑊 𝑦,𝛽 = !!!!! ∙ !!		where	the	factor	𝜌/𝑛	accounts	for	186	
shared	paternity	and	female	death	before	reproduction.	Using	the	‘Fisher	condition’	requirement	187	
that	average	male	and	female	fitness	are	linked	by	the	primary	sex	ratio	r,	we	calculate	the	188	
operational	sex	ratio	𝛽	by	numerically	solving	the	equation	𝑊 𝑥,𝛽 =𝑊 𝑦,𝛽 ∙ 𝑟	for	given	189	
resident	strategies	x	and	y.	We	then	proceed	as	before	to	calculate	selection	gradients	on	male	190	
and	female	search	effort.	191	
	192	
Results	193	
Basic	model	194	
Depending	on	the	search	function	f	and	search	cost	coefficient	c,	we	predict	ESSs	where	both	195	
sexes	invest	equally	in	mate	searching,	or	where	either	sex	does	all	of	the	searching	(fig.	2).	The	196	
location	of	these	equilibria	is	symmetrical,	in	the	sense	that	for	every	equilibrium	with	unequal	197	
searching,	there	exists	an	equivalent	equilibrium	with	reversed	roles.	Crucially,	however,	the	198	
corresponding	trajectories	(hence	ranges	of	attraction)	are	not	symmetrical.	This	is	most	notable	if	199	
mate	encounter	rates	are	high	(high	M)	because	male	effort	then	evolves	much	faster	than	female	200	
effort	(vertical	trajectories	in	bottom	row	of	fig.	2),	reflecting	stronger	selection	on	males.	Where	201	
alternative	ESSs	exist	(first	panel	of	fig.	2),	outcomes	with	male-biased	searching	are	therefore	202	
more	accessible	from	low-effort	ancestral	conditions	(because	males	are	quicker	to	evolve	away	203	
from	maladaptively	low	levels	of	searching);	outcomes	with	female-biased	searching	are	more	204	
ρ
	 11	
accessible	from	high-effort	ancestral	conditions	(because	males	are	quicker	to	evolve	away	from	205	
maladaptively	high	levels	of	searching).	To	derive	ESS	solutions	analytically,	we	note	that	fitness	is	206	
maximised	when	the	probability	 p = mm+µI
of	surviving	a	given	time-in	is	maximised,	provided	207	
that	searching	affects	only	mortality	during	time-in.	Because	dp/dx	is	positive	when	increasing	x	208	
causes	higher	proportional	changes	in	m	than	in	µI ,	the	requirement	dp/dx	=	0	of	an	ESS	with	x	>	209	
0	implies	 dmdx ⋅m =
dµI
dx ⋅µI
.	With	our	definition	of	m,	this	leads	to	the	implicit	solution	210	
df
dx ⋅ f =
dµI
dx ⋅µI
,	which	illustrates	three	general	properties	of	the	ESS.	It	is:	1)	independent	of	M;	2)	211	
independent	of	𝛽,	hence	of	parental	investment	as	measured	by	time-out	durations	T	and	𝑇;	3)	212	
symmetric	between	the	sexes.	The	equation	depends	only	on	f	and	µI ,	so	it	follows	that	the	same	213	
equilibria	apply	to	each	sex	if	these	functions	are	the	same	for	each	sex.	For	the	multiplicative	case	214	
(f	=	x	y),	this	simplifies	to	the	closed-form	solution:		𝑥!"" = 𝑦!"" = (𝑐 − 1)!! ! 	.	215	
The	symmetry	of	ESSs	can	be	broken	in	favour	of	male-biased	searching	if	we	assume	there	are	216	
search-related	mortality	costs	that	extend	beyond	the	period	of	searching,	as	posited	by	our	‘carry	217	
over’	hypothesis	(fig.	3a).	These	costs	generate	an	asymmetry	because	mortality	outside	of	the	218	
period	of	searching	(i.e.,	during	time-out)	is	disproportionately	costly	for	the	sex	(here:	females)	219	
that	spends	a	greater	proportion	of	its	time	in	this	state.	The	symmetry	of	ESSs	can	also	be	broken	220	
if	females	pay	higher	mortality	costs	while	searching	than	do	males	for	the	same	amount	of	effort	221	
(fig.	3b).	222	
	223	
Mating	window	model	224	
This	model	yields	ESSs	with	male-biased	searching	under	both	monandry	and	polyandry,	and	even	225	
if	processing	times	T	and	𝑇	are	the	same	for	both	sexes	(fig.	3c-d).	The	analytic	argument	outlined	226	
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above	still	applies	for	males,	so	their	ESS	effort	still	depends	only	on	f	and	𝜇!.	Females’	ESS	effort,	227	
however,	now	decreases	as	the	mate	encounter	coefficient	M	increases	(fig.	4).	This	result	holds	228	
for	both	search	functions,	but	is	easiest	to	visualize	for	the	multiplicative	case	which	has	no	229	
alternative	ESSs.	Female	search	effort	also	decreases	with	mating	window	duration	F	under	broad	230	
conditions	(fig.	4).	231	
	232	
Discussion	233	
In	nature	there	is	a	general	trend	for	males	to	invest	more	than	females	in	mate-searching.	A	234	
previous	model	by	Hammerstein	and	Parker	(1987)	showed	that	this	pattern	is	not	attributable	to	235	
greater	female	than	male	parental	investment	(including	anisogamy	itself)	and	the	longer	‘time-236	
out’	after	mating	of	females.	A	subsequent	model	by	Kokko	and	Wong	(2007)	stated	that,	in	237	
addition	to	the	ESSs	being	symmetric,	the	strength	of	selection	on	each	sex	is	also	symmetric	even	238	
if	there	are	sex	differences	in	parental	investment;	but	that	it	is	possible	for	male-biased	searching	239	
to	evolve	if	females	are	polyandrous	or	if	they	pay	a	higher	search	cost	than	males	(Kokko	and	240	
Wong	2007).	Here	we	re-examine	these	claims	and	find	that	only	the	latter	can	be	substantiated.	241	
We	then	provide	support	for	two	additional	explanations	for	the	evolution	of	male-biased	mate	242	
searching.		243	
	244	
Three	explanations	for	male-biased	searching	245	
First,	we	tested	the	‘mating	window	hypothesis’,	which	is	that	females	have	less	incentive	to	246	
search	if	the	exact	timing	of	mating	does	not	matter	to	them,	so	long	as	they	acquire	a	mate	247	
during	the	window.	We	found	that	the	existence	of	a	mating	window	does	indeed	favour	male-248	
biased	searching,	and	that	this	effect	is	compatible	with	both	monandry	and	polyandry	(figs.	3,	4).	249	
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This	confirms	the	intuitive	expectation	that	waiting	to	be	found	becomes	a	sensible	alternative	to	250	
searching	when	time	pressure	to	mate	is	relaxed.	251	
	252	
Second,	we	tested	the	‘carry-over	hypothesis’,	which	is	that	females	have	less	incentive	to	invest	253	
in	searching	if	the	costs	of	this	investment	extend	beyond	the	period	of	actual	searching.	This	254	
hypothesis	was	also	supported	by	our	model	(fig.	4,	lower	row).	To	appreciate	why	this	occurs	we	255	
need	to	consider	what	maintains	the	symmetry	of	male	and	female	search	effort	in	our	baseline	256	
model	(fig.	2)	(see	also	Hammerstein	and	Parker	1987;	Kokko	and	Wong	2007).	In	this	initial	257	
scenario,	if	females	have	a	longer	time-out	duration	than	males,	then	the	operational	sex	ratio	258	
(OSR)	becomes	male-biased,	and,	on	average,	females	spend	little	time	searching.	As	a	result,	both	259	
the	costs	and	benefits	of	female	searching	arise	only	during	brief	periods,	which	reduces	the	260	
strength	of	selection	on	this	behaviour	while	leaving	its	optimum	unaffected.	By	contrast,	if	261	
search-related	mortality	also	arises	during	time-out	(as	posited	by	the	carry-over	hypothesis),	this	262	
has	a	proportionately	greater	effect	on	females	because	of	their	longer	time-out	duration.	They	263	
compensate	for	this	by	reducing	their	search	effort.	For	similar	reasons,	Kokko	et	al.	(2012)	264	
predicted	that	the	sex	with	a	longer	time-out	duration	should	have	lower	'scope	for	competitive	265	
investment’	(i.e.,	it	should	invest	less	in	sexually	selected	traits,	which	include	mate	search),	based	266	
on	a	model	in	which	costs	were	expressed	as	a	proportional	decline	in	fitness	that	was	267	
independent	of	the	amount	of	time	spent	searching.		268	
	269	
Third,	in	agreement	with	Kokko	and	Wong	(2007),	our	model	supports	the	”sex-specific	cost”	270	
hypothesis,	which	states	that	females	should	search	less	if	the	mortality	rate	increase	per	search	271	
effort	is	higher	for	females	than	for	males	(fig.	3b).		272	
	273	
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We	have	therefore	identified	three	alternative,	non-mutually	exclusive	explanations	for	male-274	
biased	searching.	It	will	be	challenging	to	disentangle	these	possibilities	empirically.	Our	tentative	275	
assessment	is	that	the	‘mating	window	hypothesis’	is	widely	applicable	in	species	with	internal	276	
fertilisation,	where	it	may	provide	a	crucial	link	in	the	causal	chain	between	female-biased	277	
parental	investment	and	low	Bateman-gradients	for	females	(see	below).		278	
The	‘carry-over	hypothesis’	is	probably	also	relevant	in	many	species	because	of	the	evolution	of	279	
morphological	traits	that	impose	costs	even	after	searching	has	ended,	including	fitness	costs	280	
other	than	mortality	(e.g.,	lower	fecundity).	It	is	important	to	note	that	this	hypothesis	does	not	281	
require	that	females	are	more	likely	to	evolve	such	traits	–	only	that	such	traits	impose	costs	with	282	
no	compensating	benefit	for	a	greater	proportion	of	a	female’s	life	(i.e.	because	females	have	a	283	
longer	time-out	relative	to	time-in	than	do	males).	Finally,	the	‘sex-specific	cost	hypothesis’	284	
remains	plausible,	but	it	has	little	a	priori	support	and	it	is	not	clear	why	it	would	generally	apply	285	
across	many	taxa.		286	
	287	
Polyandry	and	mating	windows	288	
In	the	current	models	we	do	not	find	support	for	Kokko	and	Wong's	(2007)	prediction	that	289	
polyandry	per	se	favours	male-biased	searching.	We	note	that	this	prediction	arose	from	a	model	290	
where	a	mating	window	was	included	to	ensure	polyandry,	and	not	one	designed	to	test	directly	291	
for	the	effect	of	a	mating	window.	The	two	factors	were	therefore	conflated.	We	found	in	the	292	
current	model	that	a	mating	window	leads	to	male-biased	searching	regardless	of	whether	or	not	293	
females	are	polyandrous	(figs.	3c-d,	fig.	4).	In	nature,	of	course,	if	mating	window	length	correlates	294	
with	the	degree	of	polyandry	(which	seems	likely	in	many	species),	a	correlation	might	still	arise	295	
between	polyandry	and	male-biased	searching.	Although	polyandry	is	associated	with	slightly	296	
more	male-biased	searching	than	is	monandry	in	our	model,	this	outcome	reflects	one	of	our	less	297	
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biologically	realistic	assumptions:	in	the	polyandry	case	we	assumed	that	mated	females	continue	298	
to	behave	like	unmated	females,	so	they	experience	costs	during	the	time-lag	with	no	299	
compensating	benefit.	Consequently,	there	is	selection	to	reduce	female	search	effort,	for	reasons	300	
analogous	to	those	described	above	for	the	carry-over	hypothesis.	We	do	not	expect	this	301	
assumption	will	necessarily	apply	in	reality	because	mated	females	might	have	a	phenotypically	302	
plastic	response	and,	for	example,	no	longer	search	for	mates	once	they	have	acquired	sperm	(but	303	
see	Kokko	and	Mappes	2013	for	an	alternative	null	hypothesis).		304	
	305	
We	have	made	the	ad	hoc	assumption	that	mating	windows	are	of	a	fixed	duration.	In	reality,	their	306	
duration	might	evolve.	Short	mating	windows	might	be	a	biological	constraint	arising	as	a	side-307	
effect	of	internal	fertilisation	(because	sperm	can	survive	in	a	female	tract	for	a	short	while	even	in	308	
the	absence	of	specialised	storage	organs;	Orr	and	Brennan	2015).	However,	a	longer	mating	309	
window	could	evolve	as	a	female	strategy	to	make	additional	use	of	any	pre-existing	time	delays	310	
before	reproduction,	e.g.,	while	maturing	ova,	building	up	fat	reserves,	or	waiting	for	suitable	311	
breeding	conditions.	By	temporally	decoupling	mating	from	reproduction	in	this	way,	females	can	312	
solve	the	problem	of	ensuring	fertilisation	before	it	becomes	a	pressing	matter.	Incidentally,	this	313	
suggests	that	females	differ	from	males	in	having	an	additional	option	when	access	to	mates	314	
becomes	limiting:	instead	of	investing	in	mate	search	to	increase	the	mate	encounter	rate,	they	315	
might	evolve	earlier	receptivity	to	increase	mating	window	duration.	This	could	provide	yet	316	
another	reason	why	males	are	more	likely	to	end	up	in	the	searching	role.		317	
	318	
Conclusion	319	
In	sum,	our	models	shed	new	light	on	classic	arguments	about	sex	role	evolution,	by	exposing	the	320	
logic	of	a	mechanism	that	links	parental	investment	to	selection	on	mate	search.	Certain	forms	of	321	
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parental	investment	(e.g.,	formation	of	nutrient-rich	eggs;	building	up	reserves	for	pregnancy)	322	
take	time	that	can	simultaneously	be	used	as	a	mating	window	to	acquire	opposite	sex	gametes.	323	
The	sex	that	provides	this	greater	investment	may,	in	part,	be	released	from	the	time	pressure	to	324	
mate.	In	principle,	there	could	be	a	male	mating	window	(e.g.	males	could	acquire	eggs	before	325	
they	are	ready	to	fertilize	and/or	care	for	them),	but	this	seems	implausible	in	most	species	given	326	
the	risk	of	lost	paternity	due	to	sperm	competition.	The	only	possible	exceptions	are	species	such	327	
as	seahorses	where	females	transfer	eggs	to	an	internal	male	‘compartment’.	Future	work	could	328	
profitably	explore	how	mating	windows	initially	evolve,	what	selects	for	variation	in	their	duration,	329	
and	how	they	affect	other	aspects	of	sex	role	evolution,	such	as	choosiness	and	parental	care.		330	
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Appendix	
The	model	by	Kokko	and	Wong	(2007)	(henceforth	KW)	on	the	evolution	of	mate-searching	336	
contained	several	unfortunate	errors.	First,	they	did	not	take	into	account	the	stable	state	337	
frequencies	(the	right	eigenvector	of	the	transition	matrix;	Caswell	1978;	Pen	and	Weissing	2000)	338	
when	calculating	selection	gradients.	Consequently,	KW	did	not	take	into	account	how	the	339	
duration	of	a	trait’s	expression	(e.g.	if	expressed	only	while	searching	rather	than	throughout	life)	340	
affects	its	exposure	to	selection.	This	created	a	false	impression	that	selection	for	searching	is	341	
equally	strong	in	both	sexes,	leading	to	symmetrical	evolutionary	trajectories	(fig.	2	in	KW)	even	342	
when	the	sexes	differed	greatly	in	the	time	spent	searching.	To	appreciate	the	problem	intuitively,	343	
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notice	that	selection	must	become	infinitely	weak	as	we	approach	the	limiting	case	where	one	sex	344	
spends	zero	time	searching,	so	that	it’s	search	effort	is	never	‘seen’	by	selection.		345	
	346	
Second,	KW’s	equation	3c	violates	the	so-called	‘Fisher	condition’,	because	it	does	not	evaluate	to	347	
unity.	The	‘Fisher	condition’	states	that	fitness,	hence	reproductive	value	at	birth,	must	be	equal	348	
between	the	sexes	when	the	primary	sex	ratio	is	equal	(Houston	and	McNamara	2005).	In	KW’s	349	
model,	reproductive	value	in	time-in	is	equivalent	to	reproductive	value	at	birth,	because	there	is	350	
no	senescence;	hence	𝑣!"∗  = 𝑣!"∗ 	must	hold	to	satisfy	the	Fisher	condition.		351	
	352	
Third,	KW	did	not	derive	the	equilibrium	fecundity	g	that	keeps	population	size	stable.	Instead	353	
they	used	the	arbitrary	value	of	g	=	2	in	their	numerical	examples.	This	conflicted	with	their	354	
assumption	of	constant	population	size	when	calculating	the	operational	sex	ratio.	When	355	
combined,	these	issues	lead	to	qualitatively	different	evolutionary	trajectories	and	ESSs,	as	is	356	
evident	by	comparison	of	fig.	2	in	KW	and	fig.	2	in	the	present	paper.		357	
	358	
To	prevent	perpetuation	of	these	errors	in	the	literature,	an	editorial	decision	was	made	to	retract	359	
KW’s	paper.	We	share	the	goal	of	alerting	readers	to	past	errors,	but	-	as	with	many	models	later	360	
seen	as	inadequate	-	we	consider	KW’s	contribution	nevertheless	a	valuable	one,	as	it	provided	361	
the	conceptual	basis	of	the	present	work.	362	
	363	
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Figure	legends	397	
Figure	1:	Schematic	representation	of	life-cycles.	A.	Every	mating	causes	an	immediate	transition	398	
to	‘time-out’	(shaded	area),	where	the	consequences	are	processed.	This	applies	to	both	sexes	in	399	
the	basic	model,	and	also	to	males	in	the	mating	window	model.	B.	In	the	monandry	case	of	the	400	
mating	window	model,	females	experience	an	additional	time-lag,	during	which	they	are	401	
unavailable	for	mating.	C.	In	the	polyandry	case	of	the	mating	window	model,	females	also	402	
experience	such	a	time-lag,	during	which	they	are	still	available	for	mating.	403	
	404	
Figure	2:	Basic	model.	Arrows	indicate	evolutionary	trajectories	(assuming	traits	evolve	at	rates	405	
proportional	to	sex-specific	selection	gradients)	whose	end	points	(ESSs)	are	marked	as	black	dots.	406	
Dashed	lines	indicate	equal	searching	by	both	sexes.	In	the	first	panel,	male-only	searching	and	407	
female-only	searching	are	alternative	ESSs.	Higher	search	costs	(in	terms	of	c)	lead	to	equal	408	
searching	by	both	sexes	(second	row,	compared	to	first	row).	Higher	mate	encounter	rates	(in	409	
terms	of	M)	make	male	searching	evolve	faster	than	female	searching,	leading	to	almost	vertical	410	
trajectories	(third	row).	Other	settings:	T	=	1,	𝑇 = 0.01,	𝜇! = 𝜇! = 0.1.	411	
	412	
Figure	3:	Evolutionary	trajectories	in	model	versions	that	lead	to	male-biased	searching.	a)	Basic	413	
model	with	carry-over	costs:	in	addition	to	search-related	mortality	during	time-in,	10%	of	these	414	
costs	apply	in	time-out:	𝜇! 𝑥 = 0.1(1+ 𝑥!.!)	and	𝜇! 𝑥 = 0.1(1+ 0.1𝑥!.!)	for	females,	versus	415	 𝜇! 𝑦 = 0.1(1+ 𝑦!.!)	and	𝜇! 𝑥 = 0.1(1+ 0.1𝑦!.!)	for	males.	b)	Basic	model	with	asymmetric	416	
costs:	females	incur	10%	higher	search-related	mortality	during	time-in	than	males:	𝜇! 𝑥 =417	 0.1(1+ 1.1𝑥!.!)	;	𝜇! 𝑦 = 0.1(1+ 𝑦!.!).	c)	Mating	window	model	with	monandry.	d)	Mating	418	
window	model	with	polyandry.	Settings	in	c)	and	d):	𝐹 = 1,	𝑇 = 𝑇 = 0.01.	Default	settings:	𝑀 =419	 1,	𝜇! 𝑥 = 0.1(1+ 𝑥!.!),	𝜇! 𝑦 = 0.1(1+ 𝑦!.!),	𝜇! = 𝜇! = 0.1,	T	=	1,	𝑇 = 0.01.	Search	efforts	420	
	20	
are	multiplicative,	f	=	x	y.	421	
	422	
Figure	4:	ESS	search	effort	of	males	(y;	dash-dotted)	and	either	monandrous	or	polyandrous	423	
females,	in	the	model	with	a	mating	window.	As	the	mate-encounter	coefficient	M	increases,	424	
females	(but	not	males)	search	less,	especially	if	the	mating	window	duration	F	is	long.	Other	425	
settings:	𝑇 = 𝑇 = 0.01,	𝜇! = 𝜇! = 0.1,	𝑐 = 1.2.	Search	efforts	are	multiplicative,	f	=	x	y.	426	
